Category Archives: Group/Intergroup Processes

On the effectiveness of intergroup apologies

By Kevin R. Betts

A common theme of my previous posts concerns intergroup conflict and its resolution. Some conflicts I have examined include clashes in Bangkok between anti-government protestors and the Thai government, relations between the LAPD and bicycle commuters, immigrant relations in Arizona, conflict on the Korean peninsula, and reciprocal determinants of terrorist and counterterrorist actions. The nature of these conflicts is complex, and accordingly, the interventions I proposed have sometimes been complex as well. But a recent article by Blatz and Philpot (2010) suggests that some of these conflicts may not require complex solutions. Rather, a simple public apology may sometimes be all that is needed to restore peace.

Blatz and Philpot (2010) suggest that intergroup apologies can improve intergroup attitudes, restore trust, and promote forgiveness. Additionally, they identify nine moderators (intentionality, time since harm, severity, privity, costliness, time since apology, trust, power, and identification) and four mediators (remorse, sincerity, empathy, and assigning responsibility) that influence apology-outcome relationships. Although it is beyond the scope of this brief post to examine all of these factors, one can imagine how each might relate to the conflicts discussed above. Take whether or not the perpetrators intended to harm the victim (intentionality) as an example. This past summer, I wrote about an incident where an LAPD officer was filmed kicking a bicycle commuter during the monthly mass bicycling event Critical Mass. As an organization, the LAPD reacted to this incident by condemning the actions of the officer and expressing their support of lawful bicycle commuting. Framing this incident as unreflective of the LAPD as an organization (unintentional) may have aided their attempt to restore relations with bicycle commuters in the city. In contrast, intergroup apologies should be less effective when transgressions are clearly intentional. For example, the North Korean government openly takes credit for their recent attack on the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong. Although an official apology is certainly warranted for this attack, it is unlikely to be effective in achieving the immediate forgiveness of South Koreans.

Clearly, not all intergroup conflicts can be resolved with an apology. What should be taken from this research is that when certain conditions are met, the power of a simple public apology for improving intergroup attitudes, restoring trust, and promoting forgiveness should not be underestimated.

Read more

Blatz, C.W., & Philpot, C. (2010). On the outcomes of intergroup apologies. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4, 995-1007.

Destruction on island at center of Korean barrage (CNN)

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Targeting terrorist capability versus intent

By Kevin R. Betts

Late last week, two Chicago-addressed packages containing hidden bombs were shipped out of Yemen by an unknown source. The packages successfully progressed through multiple countries and aircraft before a tip from the Saudi Arabian intelligence service led officials in Britain and Dubai to seize the packages. Although ultimately unsuccessful, this attempted attack lends credibility to the capability and intent of terrorist outfits who threaten acts of violence.

Much has been done to reduce the capabilities of terrorists seeking to engage in acts of violence. Impressive new technologies and training programs designed for this purpose emerge on a regular basis. However, the effectiveness of these measures is limited by the ability of terrorist outfits to adapt to and overcome them. The successful progression of the abovementioned bombs through multiple countries and aircraft indicate continued capability among terrorist organizations despite  advances in security. From this perspective, intent becomes very important because whether or not terrorist outfits are capable of following through with threats of violence becomes irrelevant once intent to engage in such acts is eliminated. In other words, influencing the intentions of terrorists may have more long-term effects.

How can we convince terrorist outfits to cease their violent attacks? Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) identify numerous strategies that target intent, many of which have already been implemented in deradicalization programs around the world. For example, activists in Yemen have established the Committee for Dialogue, whereby Muslim scholars and suspected members of al-Qaeda engage in religious dialogue designed to address detainees’ apparent misinterpretations of the Q’uran. Although the recipients of these programs remain capable of initiating acts of violence, many of them cease these acts as their intention dissolves. Research in the behavioral sciences provides a multitude of potential techniques for influencing such intentions.

Ultimately, both capability and intent must be targeted as they dually contribute to terrorist threat. Once threats have materialized, security measures that prevent their realization are imperative. Yet, to prevent terrorist attacks in a long-term sense, a focus on intent is essential.

Read more:

Bomb plot shows key role played by intelligence (NYTimes)

Kruglanski, A.W., & Fishman, S. (2009). Psychological factors in terrorism and countereterrorism: Individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis. Social Issues and Policy Review, 3, 1-44.

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More BS From The BCS: The Oregon Ducks Get Shafted Again!

By, P. Getty

Of course my wife would never agree with me—she’s less of a Notre Dame fan than she is an ardent despiser of the Ducks—but as the title of this little rant indicates, the big news this week is that the Oregon Ducks got screwed out of the #1 spot on the BCS rankings again. Three weeks in a row, the #1 team (Alabama, Ohio State and Oklahoma, respectively) was knocked off the top. After Alabama was defeated and Ohio State took their place, Oregon moved up to #2 spot, where they remain. Since Ohio States’ defeat the following week, a lower-ranked team has passed both Boise State (#3) and Oregon to steal the top spot! One would expect, as I do, that if the top ranked teams is defeated, then the #2 team should take their spot. Am I right?

Well not according to the BCS’ f’ing computer system! How can it be that a damn computer program rank the Ducks #11 when every human poll has them ranked at #1, where, in my not-so-humble opinion, they belong? I don’t understand it—though I do. I don’t want to understand it—though I must. The answer, of course: statistics.

Statistics, however, is not the reason why I’ve been cursing the BCS or #1 team and their fans, hoping that they will crash and burn during the next week’s game. The problem is that ever since I’ve become what I like to call a “pilgrim in an unholy land” (Pennsylvania), I’ve become strongly attached to all that is Oregon, the Ducks being especially salient in that they represent my alma mater (and my wife’s but she hates them). It’s as if they have somehow been incorporated into my social identity—my in-group—and their neglect in the rankings have made me prone to fits of rage! I wonder if this realization explains my hatred for the top team? I wonder if this hatred is unusual?

Well, according to Nicholas Dixon (2001), who has written on the ethics of sports fans, would probably say, yes, it is unusual. Dixon believes that loyalty to one’s team is ultimately a “good,” because fan loyalty does not equate to harshness towards other teams or their fans. I believe I challenge that notion. Still, I don’t think Dixon is familiar with the inter-group literature, because the majority of that literature would predict that a strong-identifier, like me, would do about anything, even derogating the other teams publicly, to insure my in-group’s superior status….

Thankfully, though, while my feelings are strong in the matter, the ethical side of my conscious is clear; I haven’t stooped to outgroup derogation that this literature suggests (see Branscombe & Wann, 1994, for a review) I would. Nope. I haven’t gone out of my way to publicly bash the undeserving numskulls at Auburn (the current #1 ranked team), or their idiot fans who probably bribed the programmers over at the BCS to move them up to the top spot from #4 when they clearly deserve to be rotting at the bottom of the rankings….

Did I just write that?

BCS Computers don’t like Oregon Much, by Larry Brown

Dixon (2001)

Branscombe & Wann (1994)

Glass ceiling or labyrinth? Reexamining the gender gap at the top

By Kevin R. Betts

I was recently asked to give a talk in an organizational psychology course about the gender gap in leadership positions. In determining the approach I would take for this talk, I asked several colleagues for their thoughts on the issue. The near immediate response from many of them was stated directly, “The glass ceiling!” Ostensibly, an invisible barrier referred to as a glass ceiling prevents women from securing positions of power. I imagine that this metaphor resonates with many readers as well. Ever since the Wall Street Journal’s Carol Hymowitz and Timothy Schellhardt coined this term in 1986, perceptions of a glass ceiling have been central to the public’s understanding of gender inequality in the workplace. But how accurate is this metaphor today?

Emerging evidence now suggests that the glass ceiling metaphor inadequately depicts the experiences of women in the workforce (Eagly & Carli, 2007). For example, the glass ceiling metaphor implies the presence of an impenetrable barrier to top leadership positions. Today, it is clear that this barrier is no longer impenetrable. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and PepsiCo’s CEO Indra Nooyi serve as examples of women at the top (Hoyt, 2010). Additionally, the glass ceiling metaphor leaves challenges faced by women at lower- and midlevel positions unaccounted for. Women do not progress through the ranks unimpeded before reaching these top positions. Rather, they face a series of challenges and problems along the way. Considering these limitations, Eagly and Carli (2007) have proposed that the challenges faced by women in the workforce can be better understood through the metaphor of a labyrinth. Consistent with traditional uses of the term, women aspiring to attain top leadership positions must navigate routes that are full of twists and turns. Some problems encountered within the labyrinth include prejudice, resistance to women’s leadership, issues of leadership style, demands of family life, and underinvestment in social capital. Although certainly more complex, the metaphor of a labyrinth seems to better depict challenges faced by working women today.

One can also better understand how to address the leadership gender gap using the metaphor of a labyrinth. If resistance toward women’s leadership is a primary obstacle, then interventions should target attitudes of those who are resistant to women’s leadership. If demands of family life are deemed problematic, then interventions might target the nature of relationships at home. As obstacles are identified and overcome, the leadership gender gap can be expected to shrink at a faster and faster rate.

Read more:

Where is the female Steve Jobs? (New York Times)

Glass ceiling not the obstacle it was (Yuma Sun)

Eagly, A.H., & Carli, L.L. (2007). Through the Labyrinth: The Truth about How Women become Leaders. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Hoyt, C.L. (2010). Women, men, and leadership: Exploring the gender gap at the top. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4/7, 484-498.

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Friends and Facebook: Online social behavior- not that different from the real world?

By Erica Zaiser

Continuing with my previous post about Facebook, TIME recently reported on another study using the social networking site. According to the article, researchers in Denver wanted to understand why people “defriend” others in Facebook and what types of behaviours are likely to lead to a break in the online friendship. Unsurprisingly, they found that things are pretty similar in an online social network to a real-life social network. People defriend others much for the same reasons they end real world friendships. People who go on an on about a subject on Facebook were most likely to get defriended followed by people who talk about politics or religion and people who post racist or offensive comments.

As Facebook has grown in popularity so has interest in it as an area of research for social psychologists. Another study looking at Facebook found a relationship between number of friends and impressions about a persons attractiveness and popularity. Generally more friends made participants in the study believe the person was more attractive and popular, but only to a point. When the number of friends became very large (more than 300) people then began to doubt the users popularity and rated the user as being almost as unattractive as those who had very few friends. According to the research, people began to doubt that people had accrued their large number of friends simply because they were extroverted and instead may be making assumptions that the profile owner added friends for other reasons (like they are actually desperate for friends and are just adding whomever they can to look popular).

Facebook and other online  social mediums are interesting to look at for psychologists because its both possible to study unique social phenomenon in the online world but also because behaviours online may help researchers understand behaviours offline. Perhaps in real life, people who are seen as “too social” are sometimes viewed as negatively as people who have just a few friends.

Read more: Too much of a good thing? The relationship between number of friends and interpersonal impressions on Facebook

CNN on Long and ParrisRead more: TIME article: How to lose Facebook friends the fastest.

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Terrorism as collective communication

By Kevin R. Betts

Recently, intelligence surfaced about several dozen Muslim militants with European citizenship training for attacks that may involve European capitals. These reports are especially worrisome because unlike previous threats, this most recent one involves individuals with unrestricted access between training grounds in Pakistan and various European countries. Western officials are currently advising vigilance among those living and traveling in Europe as attempts are made to dismantle the threat.

Research on terrorist threats like the one captured above have surged following the shocking attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. Is it possible to make sense of these threats using this research and improve counterterrorism efforts? Recent work by Fischer, Fischer, Weisweiler, and Frey (2010) suggests that we can. They presented a collective communication model of terrorism (CCMT), which “proposes that terrorism is a complex process of collective dialogue between terrorists and potential victims about political/societal issues and aims…” Their model is an extension of the classic communication model, which comprises a sender, a message, and a receiver. In the CCMT, the terrorist as sender possesses attributes that influence the nature of interactions with the receiver. These attributes may regard cultural origin and motive for the attack, among others. The victim of terrorist threats is the receiver in this model, and also possesses various attributes that influence the nature of interactions. The message in this model may concern political or social issues, and is communicated through a threat or attack committed by the terrorist on to the victim. Fischer et al. (2010) extend this basic model further by considering ways in which the receiver interprets and responds to the message. For instance, victims may respond in ways that are conflict-escalating or deescalating, either of which communicates a new message to the terrorist. This often results in a cyclical process whereby the sender and receiver continuously switch roles sending opposing messages.

What is the implication of this research for counterterrorism efforts? If terrorists and victims simply take turns communicating opposing messages, then no solution can be reached. For counterterrorism measures to be effective, genuine understanding of the motives behind terrorist threats is necessary. Why do today’s terrorists feel hatred toward their victims? Why do they see violence as an acceptable medium of communication? By answering these questions, we may be able reduce the number of future threats, and respond more appropriately to those that still emerge.

Read more:

Dozens of Europeans in terror training (MSNBC)

Fischer, P., Fischer, J.K, Weisweiler, S., & Frey, D. (2010). Terrorism as collective communication: The collective communication model of terrorism (CCMT). Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4/9, 692-703.

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Responding to violence in U.S. hospitals

By Kevin R. Betts

For several years, I worked at a psychiatric hospital as a mental health technician. For the most part, I found this job to be very fulfilling. Watching patients who arrived in disarray leave feeling content left me feeling that what I was doing was worthwhile, and the occasional thank you card or call from a previous patient didn’t hurt either. However, there were certainly challenges inherent to this job. One such challenge concerned how best to react to patients who became angry or aggressive. When confronted by such a patient, a common response among the staff was to corral other staff members in an attempt to intimidate the patient into submission. In contrast to staff expectations, however, these attempts were often met by the patient with obstinance, and they sometimes even appeared to encourage further aggressive behaviors.

The media has recently given increased attention to violence in U.S. hospitals like that captured in my account above. Events such as the recent shooting at John Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, as well as a recent Joint Commission report about increasing rates of violence in hospital emergency rooms, has earned the attention of health care workers and the general public alike. Unfortunately, one thing that can be gathered from these reports and my account above is that most hospital staff members receive only limited training in how to respond to angry or aggressive patients.

Research on the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity informs us that corralling other staff members to confront an angry patient who is alone, as often occurred at my workplace, will likely be ineffective in reducing that patient’s anger or aggression. The interindividual-intergroup discontinuity suggests that interactions between groups, or between groups and individuals, will be more competitive and aggressive than interactions between individuals alone (Meier, Hinsz, & Heimerdinger, 2007). There are three mechanisms that are believed to be responsible for this effect. One mechanism suggests that we fear and distrust other groups more than other individuals. A second mechanism suggests that group members can provide social support for antisocial actions, whereas individuals cannot. The third mechanism concerns identifiability, meaning that our (antisocial) actions are more identifiable when we act alone than when we act in a group. What is the implication of this research for health care workers? When it can be safely done, angry or aggressive patients should be confronted one-on-one.

Read more:

Violence in U.S. hospitals (CNN)

Violence on the rise in U.S. health care centers (Businessweek)

Meier, B.P., Hinsz, V.B., & Heimerdinger, S.R. (2007). A framework for explaining aggression involving groups. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 1, 298-312.

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